Is Group Identity Efficient?

An Empirical Test of Team Preference and Collective Intentionality Theories

Abstract:

Theories of collective intentionality have roots in three different disciplines: group identity theory in psychology, team preference theories in economics, and collective intentionality theories in philosophy. Although philosophers have often endorsed a naturalistic approach to collective intentions, they have mostly focused on purely conceptual issues such as the reducibility of collective to individual intentionality or the existence of logically distinct forms of collective intention. Psychologists and game theorists, in contrast, have provided most of the empirical data that is currently available on this topic. These data, however, come from experiments that were not especially devised to test collective intentionality theory, and hence do not speak convincingly either for or against the theory. In particular, they fail to distinguish between genuine collective intentions (or team preferences) and norm-based explanations of group behaviour.

            Following Bratman's and Bacharach's analyses, I argue that a decisive test of collective intentionality or team preference theory must focus on a special class of perturbations of individual payoffs, which allow one to check whether experimental subjects are pursuing collective or individual goals. The payoff structure however must be designed in such a way as to control for other-regarding preferences (or social norms) such as altruism and inequality-aversion. Finally, I present new data from a large set of mini-dictator games showing that group identity (1) does not improve significantly the joint payoffs of group members, but in several cases actually reduces efficiency; (2) does not systematically enhance altruism; (3) has a levelling effect, making subjects particularly averse to disadvantageous inequality; and (4) tends to moderate selfish preferences. The data overall suggest that theories of social norms provide a better explanation of group behaviour than collective intentionality or team preference models.